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A	hard	Irish	border	is	quite	possible,	a	frictionless
one	is	an	oxymoron
The	prospects	for	‘frictionless’	and	‘invisible’	solutions	for	the	Irish	border	after	Brexit	are	limited.	Dr
Katy	Hayward	(Queen’s	University	Belfast)	outlines	a	‘practical’	summary	of	the	difference	that
would	be	made	by	a	‘hard’	Brexit	to	the	movement	of	goods	across	the	Irish	border.	
Michel	Barnier’s	dismissal	of	the	notion	of	‘frictionless’	trade	between	the	UK	and	EU	after	Brexit
has	direct	ramifications	for	one	of	the	most	complex	problems	faced	by	the	Brexit	negotiators:	how
to	manage	the	Irish	border.	The	UK	government	has	frequently	emphasised	its	desire	to	see	the
continuation	of	the	‘seamless	frictionless	border’	with	the	Republic	of	Ireland	after	Brexit	and,	more	recently,
David	Davis	has	affirmed	the	UK	government’s	desire	to	maintain	an	‘invisible	border’	between	the	UK	and
Ireland.	For	its	part,	the	European	Union	has	expressed	a	commitment	to	‘working	hard	to	avoid	a	hard
border’	and	a	desire	to	find	‘flexible	and	imaginative	solutions’	to	achieve	this.
‘hard’	border	is	a	real	possibility,	and	a	‘frictionless’	border	is	almost	an
oxymoron
The	cautious	realism	of	the	EU	on	this	front	is	notable:	a	‘hard’	border	is	a	real	possibility,	and	a	‘frictionless’
border	is	almost	an	oxymoron.	This	is	especially	true	given	that	the	overall	logic	of	Brexit	is	interpreted	by	the	UK
government	as	being	to	‘take	back’	control	of	immigration,	laws	and	trade.	A	so-called	‘hard	Brexit’	would	mean
that	the	Irish	border	would	be	a	frontier	to	the	free	movement	of	people,	goods,	services	and	capital	that	is	a
feature	and	condition	of	membership	of	the	EU.	For	the	UK’s	land	border	with	the	EU	to	remain	frictionless	and
seamless	whilst	its	sea	borders	are	more	heavily	controlled	after	Brexit,	would	mean	one	of	three	things:	Northern
Ireland	would	hold	a	different	position	within	the	UK	(i.e.	its	territory	would	be	treated	differently	from	those	in
Great	Britain),	the	Republic	of	Ireland	would	have	a	different	position	in	the	EU	(i.e.	its	territory	would	be	treated
differently	from	the	rest	of	the	Single	Market),	or	the	EU	would	‘relax’	its	rules	regarding	freedom	of	movement
and	the	integrity	of	its	legal	order.
The	Irish	government	has	been		consistent	in	its	commitment	to	full	EU
membership
Barnier’s	recent	statement	confirms	that	this	latter	option	is	nowhere	near	the	negotiating	table	–	it	is	a	move	that
would	be	seen	as	turning	Brexit	into	an	act	of	self-harm	for	the	EU	itself.	The	Irish	government	has	been	equally
consistent	in	its	commitment	to	full	EU	membership.	Any	bespoke	arrangements	for	Northern	Ireland	would	have
to	be	a	matter	for	parallel,	careful	negotiation	with	the	parties	to	the	1998	Agreement,	including	both
governments.	The	current	suspension	of	the	talks	between	Northern	Ireland	parties	does	not	bode	well	for	the
forward-thinking,	creative	and	bold	conversations	that	would	have	to	be	held	in	a	re-working	of	the	Agreement	for
the	purposes	of	agreeing	on	a	unique	NI-centred	arrangement.	It	is	perhaps	for	such	reasons	that	the	language	of
the	UK	government	has	moved	away	from	promises	of	a	‘frictionless’	border	towards	one	focusing	on	the
possibility	that	it	may	be	‘invisible’.
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Border	&	Customs	at
Strabane	Northern	Ireland,	Ulster	(1968),	image	by	henrikjon,	licenced	under	(CC	BY	2.0)
The	physical	manifestation	of	the	Irish	border	has	taken	various	forms	over	the	course	of	its	95	year	history	–
customs	posts	on	both	sides,	military	checkpoints,	dumping	grounds	of	marker	dye	‘laundered’	by	criminals	from
agricultural	use	diesel	(a	messy	but	lucrative	form	of	duty	evasion)	–	but	for	the	most	part	it	has	been	an
imperceptible	line	that	winds	through	fields	and	over	rivers,	even	across	farmyards.	Its	legacy	is	marked	now	not
by	boundary	lines	but	by	the	lingering	economic	disadvantages	of	the	mainly	rural	regions	through	which	the
border	runs.	The	common	UK	and	Irish	membership	of	the	EU	Single	Market	did	much	to	remove	the	visibility
and	friction	associated	with	the	Irish	border.	Membership	has	removed	customs	tariffs,	harmonised	regulation	and
indirect	taxation,	and	created	a	more	level	playing	field	for	trade	and	competitiveness	across	the	border.	The
Republic	of	Ireland	is	Northern	Ireland’s	most	important	export	partner	(31%	of	all	Northern	Ireland’s	exports,	and
56%	of	its	trade	to	the	EU).
UK	and	Irish	membership	of	the	EU	Single	Market	did	much	to	remove	the
visibility	and	friction	associated	with	the	Irish	border
The	risks	posed	by	Brexit	to	cross-border	relations	on	the	island	of	Ireland	thus	not	only	have	fraught	symbolic
resonance	but	also	starkly	concrete	implications.	The	movement	of	goods	is	a	particularly	complicated	matter	if
the	border	is	to	remain	‘invisible’,	if	not	‘frictionless’.	The	future	designation	of	goods	originating	in	Northern
Ireland	will	affect	the	nature	of	the	controls	required	on	them	in	crossing	the	Irish	border.	Such	controls	will	be
necessary	to	uphold	the	integrity	of	the	customs	regime	on	either	side	of	this	border.	Technological	solutions	in
this	area	are	limited	and	tend	to	rely	on	features	that	will	be	difficult	to	implement	in	the	case	of	the	Irish	border.
These	include	effective	IT	systems	for	traders	to	make	customs	declarations	and	for	customs	enforcement	to
perform	risk	analysis	on	these	declared	goods,	on	the	predominance	of	single	load	containers	for	tracking	(rather
than	those	containing	a	range	of	products	for	delivery),	on	designated	entry	points	along	a	land	border	for
tracking/stopping	the	movement	of	goods,	and	on	large	spaces	for	customs	inspections	(for	undeclared	items,
duty	evasion	or	dangerous	goods)	to	be	performed.	There	are	problems	associated	with	all	these	‘solutions’	when
applied	to	the	context	of	the	Irish	border.	Some	of	these	problems	arise	from	the	nature	of	cross-border	trade	on
the	island	(groupage,	Just	in	Time	logistics,	the	predominance	of	SMEs	with	small	capacity	and	no	experience	of
customs	declarations,	agri-food	supply	chains).	Others	arise	from	the	nature	of	the	border	itself,	with	over	250
crossing	points	and	an	historical	symbolism	that	would	make	any	physical	piece	of	monitoring	equipment	or
customs	checkpoint	a	security	target.
Maintaining	a	truly	invisible	border	if	there	is	to	be	‘friction’	in	the	movement	of	goods	across	the	EU’s	external
border	on	the	island	of	Ireland	would	pose	three	major	areas	of	risk:
The	first	comes	in	terms	of	the	effectiveness	of	border	management:	how	can	compliant	trade	and
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illegitimate	trade	be	distinguished,	and	how	can	one	be	facilitated	and	the	other	be	stopped,	with	absolutely
no	physical	infrastructure	and	a	complete	reliance	on	the	traders	themselves	to	comply	with	the	complex
systems	of	customs	controls	on	both	sides	of	the	border?
The	second	comes	in	terms	of	the	risks	to	the	economy	and	to	citizens	on	both	sides	of	the	border	if	there	is
a	growth	in	black	market	activity	across	the	border	–	something	that	will	become	incredibly	lucrative.
The	third	comes	in	terms	of	the	rising	capacity	for	surveillance	and	electronic	monitoring	that	may
accompany	the	growth	in	a	state’s	desire	to	be	able	to	track	movement	across	a	border	in	‘hidden’	ways.
None	of	these	three	things	are	in	any	way	desirable	in	the	Irish	context	–	indeed,	they	only	exacerbate	the
existing	dangers	and	difficulties	in	the	border	region.	If	a	frictionless	border	is	impossible,	and	an	invisible	border
undesirable,	all	hope	lies	in	the	capacity	of	all	players	for	flexibility	and	imagination.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	and	not	the	position	of	LSE	Brexit,	nor	of	the	London	School	of
Economics.
Dr	Katy	Hayward	is	Senior	Lecturer	in	Sociology	&	Senior	Research	Fellow,	Senator	George	J.	Mitchell	Institute
for	Global	Peace,	Security	and	Justice	at	Queen’s	University	Belfast.
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